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Cloud Auditing Data Federation 
CADF 
CloudStack 
a b s t r a c t 
Cloud computing is an important step in our era, delivering many advantages in business and our daily 
life. However, as every new technology, various challenges are brought into light with one of them being 
the misuse of Cloud computing environments for criminal activities. As such, Cloud service providers 
have to establish adequate forensic capabilities in order to support forensics investigations in the event 
of illegal activities in the cloud. In order to help forensics investigations, this paper deals with log format 
unification in cloud platforms using Distributed Management Task Force’s (DMTF) Cloud Auditing Data 
Federation (CADF) standard. CADF event logging is utilised in the widely used OpenStack, and we have 
modified the Apache CloudStack platform to become forensically sound. Furthermore, we investigated the 
existing CloudStack platform along with the proposed CADF event model implemented, with regards to 
the principles of the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) on handling digital evidence. The results 
are provided in this paper as well as an automated parsing tool/CADF event consumer, named C.Lo.D, 
which is freely available and can be downloaded from Github. 











































THE uprising needs to reduce service costs, the integration
f services between non-portable and portable devices and the
ver-increasing demands on storage and computing power have
ed companies to cloud computing systems. The volume of the
rocessing procedure is transferred to the cloud, making it imper-
tive to define processes of forensic analysis but also to solve the
pen challenges/limitations of forensics in this new environment.
s Dykstra [1] noted, crime heads to where people, data and
oney are gathered. 
In the era of Big Data, Virtualization and Cloud Computing,
he volume of information stored are disproportionately large
oncerning the speed of transfer. The process of acquisition during
he investigation for digital evidence is the most decisive for its
ourse since it will provide the investigator with the subject on
hich he/she will perform the forensic analysis. Limitations set by
he volume of data are time, cost, and validity. 
Cybercrime and Internet cannot be seen in isolation from one
nother. More specifically, the Internet, depending on how it is∗ Corresponding author. 







214-2126/© 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. sed by malicious users, divides cybercrime into 1) cyber-assisted,
) cyber-enabled, 3) cyber-dependent. 
Cybercriminals enjoy the same benefits of cloud usage with
usinesses. Increased computing power, increased capacity, energy
nd cost savings, anonymity and elasticity are just some of the
eatures that malicious users can take advantage of, thus expand-
ng their capabilities and goals. The creation and use of botnets,
ata-mining, crypto-mining and Command-n-Control (CnC) cen- 
res are now easier than ever. However, apart from the tools of
riminals, the range of targets is also significantly increased. Once
 customer decides to use the cloud services, he/she has to accept
hat his/her data are no longer available only for him/her or in
 particular location. When the Internet of Things (IoT)/Internet
f Anything (IoA) factor is added to the above equation, where
ach device can connect and communicate with a network – often
sing the cloud infrastructure – then, the targets (in number) and
he complexity of attacks skyrocket [2] . 
A significant motivation for cloud usage in cybercrime is also
he lack of tools and procedures of forensic analysis combined
ith open issues [3,4] . Many times, criminals do not even need
nti-forensics, as long as they use any infrastructure outside the
udicial and administrative jurisdiction of the authorities as a basis
or any malicious energy. 
A system’s log files are a critical component for debugging and
onitoring its operation and current status. During a forensic in-
























































7W’s of audit. 
W Description 
What What was the action and what was its result 
When When did the event take place 
Who Who triggered the event 
From Where From where was the event triggered 
On What What was the target of the action 
Where Who observed and reported the event 



















































1 http://uw714doc.sco.com/en/UDI _ spec/m _ mgmt.html . 
2 http://cee.mitre.org/language/1.0-beta1/cls.html . vestigation, these files may contain important information related
to the investigated incident. They are one of the key "witnesses"
of what was happening to a system at a specific time. 
It is generally accepted that the process of e-discovery, col-
lection and analysis of digital evidence in cloud environments
differs from that in-home/corporate computing systems as it is a
cross-discipline of cloud computing and digital forensics [5] . The
difference lies in the absence of tools, procedures but mainly in
the case of the possible geographical dispersion of the system un-
der investigation. Non-physical access to a system requires specific,
technical and legal, conditions of remote access to be provided. At
this point, questions are raised about ensuring the integrity of data.
In cloud environments where the amount of information of log
files is enormous, useful information may not be easily located.
Moreover, cloud-related issues such as fragmentation, geographical
dispersion and different implementations make it difficult to
identify useful information. 
This paper investigates how the Cloud Auditing Data Federation
(CADF) event model could be implemented in Apache CloudStack,
whether the existing model is improved, and what test case
scenarios could be considered. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section II pro-
vides a literature review of recent studies on auditing and cloud
forensics, Section III studies CloudStack’s current event model and
Section IV proposes DMTF’s CADF event model. Section V presents
the implementation, testing and validation of CADF for CloudStack.
In Section VI discussion raises issues and suggestions regarding
implementation and Section VII is examining CADF’s compliance
to ACPO principles. Section VIII presents a CADF log parsing tool.
Finally, in Section IX, conclusions of this paper are presented, and
in Section X, future directions are outlined. 
2. Background 
2.1. Related work 
The issue of cloud log format unification was identified by
Simou as part of the examination stage [6] while the first official
and comprehensive attempt to collect all open issues in cloud
forensics was held on behalf of NIST in 2014 [3] . A new study, in
2015, highlighted the reliance on the availability and type of log
files on the Cloud service provider [7] . In particular, in Software as
a Service (SaaS) and Platform as a Service (PaaS) models, it is the
sole responsibility of the provider to make log files available with-
out giving any assurance about the integrity of the deliverables and
whether they can be accepted by the judicial authorities or not. 
In 2011, while studying the Eucalyptus cloud platform, the
interaction of its components was recorded in logs. This detected
a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack that started through
the cloud being examined [8] . The same year, Birk and Wegener
were the first to suggest the use of a read-only API to enable
cloud customer to download data from it and offer them to the
investigators [9] . 
According to [10,11] , due to the heterogeneous nature of cloud
log files, at least 1) When the event is logged, 2) What is logged
precisely, 3) Which is the format of logging, should be specified.
Timestamp, Application, User, Session id, Severity, Reason and
Categorization are defined as minimum components of logging
following the “key-value” format. 
In research regarding ACPO guidelines and Cloud Forensics [12] ,
the impact and issues during a digital investigation on the cloud
while trying to apply the four principles were presented. Method-
ology differs accordingly to the deployment model (private, public,
hybrid, community). In a private cloud, data stores are accessible
and in known locations – by authorized personnel. The organiza-
tion’s staff can also be familiar with the auditing procedure. Onhe other hand, public clouds are owned and managed by a Cloud
ervice Provider (CSP) in a way that clients have no clue about the
nderlying infrastructure. 
As it has been already pointed out [13] , in Infrastructure as a
ervice (IaaS) model, the client is responsible for the investiga-
ions – except for exceptional cases. This paper disagrees with this
oint. A CSP must actively assist and be part of the investigative
rocess. CSP will be benefited in general more than the client if
he investigation is successful and the case is closed. In case of
n incident, it is likely that a vulnerability on the CSP’s platform
as exploited and sensitive data may have breached out. Often,
he consequences of such cases can harm the corporate reputation
nd business activity of the CSP. 
A different approach was attempted in 2015, suggesting the
pen Cloud Forensics (OCF) model [11] . There are four entities in
he OCF model - user, CSP, investigator and judicial authorities.
ased on this, every access to the cloud produces Electronically
tored Information (ESI), a thing that is not acceptable to the legal
uthorities. In order to be accepted, the CSP must follow a specific
rocedure to render it valid to the judicial authorities. This process
s continuous (Continuous Forensics Process). Although it does not
xplicitly refer to log files, the core idea includes them, as long as
hey belong to data that the CSP must validate. 
P ̆atra ̧s cu and Valeriu Patriciu presented in 2015 a forensics
ramework that can be integrated into existing cloud infrastruc-
ures as well as into new ones. After comparing two forms of
epresenting the event data, “Management Metalanguage” by
nixWare 1 and Common Event Expression (CEE) Language, 2 they
greed on a combination of both. In this way, they leveraged the
unctionality of Management Language with the help of JSON data
isualization [14] . Then, they divided the cloud architecture into
anagement and Virtualization. At the management level, they
dded a Cloud Forensics Module that assumes to log data from the
nteraction of the cloud components. At the level of virtualization,
hey suggested using Cloud Forensics Interface to collect data from
he virtual machines internal. This suggestion - at least in terms
f management - reminds strongly of the logic of a telemetry
omponent. Their idea was applied only to KVM hypervisors.
ata that can be collected are well above the log files since it is
ossible to download virtual disks and memory dumps. 
In 2015, DMTF defined the seven essential questions that need
o be answered in order to fully describe an event, known as the
W’s of audit [15] (see Table 1 ). 
Kumar Raju and Geethakumari studied in 2016, the possibility
f correlating information contained in log files from the perspec-
ive of the forensic investigator on the OpenStack platform [16] . A
ormalization process was applied to log files in order to resolve
he problem of common and single format temporarily. Correlation
f information was made on log files either from homogeneous
rtefacts or heterogeneous. 
N. Dalezios, S. Shiaeles and N. Kolokotronis et al. / Journal of Information Security and Applications 54 (2020) 102555 3 
Table 2 
Logging formats. 
Format Type Proposed by Year Status 
CBE Proprietary IBM, Cisco 2003 Dead 
CIM Open DMTF 2005 Alive 
CEF Proprietary ArcSight 2006 Alive 
CEE Open MITRE 2007 Dead 
OLF Proprietary elQNetworks 2007 Dead 
WELF Proprietary WebTrends 2008 Alive 
LEEF Proprietary Q1 Labs 2013 Alive 















































































































3 http://www.sendmail.org/ . Sekhar and Murali again raised the issue of trust in the CSP by
pplying a Secure Logging Services system. Based on the homo-
orphic encryption of log file records, they protect them against
ny possible alteration [17] . This can come either from the CSP or
rom an attacker who has gained access to the CSP and the cloud
nternals. 
The same year, a study proposed a safe logging approach based
n data collection and display by combining three algorithms [18] :
1. SystemInit – performed on CSP and produced the necessary
components for encryption. 
2. KeyGen - performed by the user and produces a type of digital
signature. 
3. SecLogging - It combines the results of the above two algo-
rithms and encrypts log blocks instead of log entries. 
In 2017, the need to establish a single mechanism for collect-
ng log files was identified since existing solutions either do not
over the different cloud models (IaaS, PaaS, SaaS) or do not over-
ome the obstacles of locating, reviewing and correlating informa-
ion in them [19] . The most comprehensive solution was the CADF
pproach, but two issues emerged. The first issue was related to
he absence of use cases and tests to demonstrate whether data
ollected on the basis of CADF are enough to conduct an investiga-
ion or not. The second one was the existence of too much data in
he log files, a fact that makes research difficult. 
The problem of integrating log files has re-emerged in the case
tudy of 3 different storage service providers (Cloud Storage Ser-
ice Provider), that is Amazon Web Services Simple Storage Ser-
ice (AWSS3), Google Cloud Platform Storage and Microsoft Azure
torage [20] . The solution suggested is the use of a single for-
at/structure in the log files. This occurs as a result of the follow-
ng three steps: 1) Collection of log files from different providers,
) Check for duplicates in the log files, 3) Conversion and normal-
zation to the desired format. The logic followed refers to the one
eveloped by CADF standard. 
In 2018, a paper was presented on the detailed examination of
loud logging mechanisms to facilitate forensic investigation [21] .
t the same time, CADF standard was implemented for CloudStack
ystem. Penetration tests were then performed to verify the proper
peration of this application, but only a Replay Attack type was
ble to be captured. The reason for this is that the implementation
as only obtaining the API calls instead of examining each event
xplicitly. 
The need for event logging is imperative for all sorts of projects,
e it simple scripts of a few tens of lines of code or large-
cale projects. However, the most important issue is What will
e logged, How it will be presented, in Which format, Where and
n How it will be stored. Various log file formats have been sug-
ested and used by organizations and companies from time to
ime. Gagliardi Rocco, in his article on a corporate blog, lists some
f the most crucial Logging formats [22] . 
It is indicative that from 2003 and onwards CIM and CADF
tand out among the open logging standards (see Table 2 ). Both are DMTF’s work, but there are no other similarities. CIM
s a standard for describing software and hardware features in
 single way for different manufacturers. Different manufacturer
roducts can be described using common fields such as device
ame, serial number, model etc. [23] . CADF is thoroughly studied
t a later stage of this paper. 
Until now (2019), the most widely accepted logging standard
s syslog, as described in RFC 5424. It is implemented with mi-
or variations from various operating systems. Although it was de-
eloped in 1983 as part of the “sendmail” project, 3 it was offi-
ially established as a standard in March 2009 [24] . The majority
f tasks performed by modern operating systems and their appli-
ations, use syslog format in log files. The main fields of the syslog
essage are the facility code, severity level, process ID, timestamp,
ostname and IP address of the resource logging the event. 
.2. Cloud auditing and forensics 
Cloud Auditing is a continuous process designed to measure
nd provides CSPs with data on the performance and compliance
ith the safety requirements of their services. These are metrics
nd statistics that enable CSPs to monitor and continually improve
heir service and safety level. Cloud Auditing is usually conducted
y a third entity if there is no dedicated team or department
ithin the organization. Auditor undertakes to complete the pro-
ess in stages, depending on the entity’s strategy, the provider’s
hecking over the safety of communications, system management
nd upgrades, data management, risk management and incident
anagement and response. However, it is important to note the
act that many times in favor of the provider’s Management, audit-
ng focuses on the performance of system services rather than on
he accurate presentation of what exactly is happening in systems
t a technical level. Auditing should include management, techni-
al staff and infrastructures [25] . It needs to be extended at all
evels (from Hardware, Host OS and Virtualization Software, etc.)
s well as in all development models (private, community, pub-
ic and hybrid). Customers of cloud providers take access to audit-
ng and monitoring data for granted. Customers will trust providers
ith their corporate and personal data and therefore, they require
pecific safeguards. Cloud Auditing is about audit procedures that
an be expanded vertically in the organizational chart of an orga-
ization as well as across its entire infrastructure. However, it is
mperative in particular for each department concerned to use a
ommon language and toolbox. Actually, as Konoor points out [26] ,
ny operation in the infrastructure must be performed in such a
ay that it provides relevant information for future analysis and
eview. 
Underlying cloud architecture is not friendly to forensics. De-
ection and analysis of any event require the use of quick tools but
rimarily of tools able to limit the scope of the investigation. Cloud
orensics tools have to face multiple challenges [3] . When it comes
o log files, in particular, there is a difficulty in terms of the criteria
ccording to which it will be determined which logs are useful and
hich can be used. Furthermore, there is no specific standard for
HAT will be logged by the CSP. Regardless of the service model
IaaS, PaaS, SaaS) data that are valuable to the investigator of a
loud incident are not on the customer’s side. On customer’s side
nly temporary files, cookies and session information files can be
ound. These do not provide enough information to associate an
ctivity with more than 3 out of 7 Ws. We see that analysis on the
SP’s side is the only way. Taking the trust to the provider’s entity
or granted, a tool and therefore, the investigator himself, should
e able to ask the provider for specific data based on criteria. Re-











































Fig. 1. CloudStack current event logging model. 
Table 3 
7W’s and EventVO. 
Question CloudStack EventVO fields 
What Description 
When createDate 
Who uuid, userId 
FromWhere no information available 
OnWhat Description 
Where no information available 



























a  ceiving them requires a secure communication channel, and their
processing requires respecting the privacy of other users. The an-
swer to the issues above is called Web API and API Endpoints. The
provision of these interfaces is now available by default on every
cloud platform. In a forensic investigation, it is necessary to min-
imize CSP’s involvement. In practice, it depends on the cloud de-
ployment model, the owner of the hardware infrastructure and the
type of cloud platforms (proprietary or open-source). However, the
use of open standards, such as the CADF, may minimize the CSP’s
possibilities to interfere in the log files. 
Naaz and Ahmad studied the possibilities and limitations of
FROST and UFED Cloud Analyzer tools [27] , whereas a study of
researchers was published the same year describing the experi-
ences and difficulties encountered in developing three cloud foren-
sics tools for the SaaS model [28] . These tools are kumodd, kumod-
ocs and kumofs. 
Simou pointed that due to the lack of cloud forensics tools, in-
vestigators use existing software solutions [4] . They either examine
acquired files with them, considering as reliable by default, or they
try to perform a remote analysis. However, the tools that enable
remote analysis have not been tested and certified regarding the
appropriateness and preservation of data integrity and thus do not
provide any assurance that they will be accepted by the judicial
authorities. 
Finally, there are also custom cloud-based solutions applied by
organizations for inside use. Netflix is one such case [29] . These
solutions are proprietary and are not available to the general pub-
lic, or they are commercial products, or at best they fall into Free
and Open Source (FOSS) category. 
The NIST Institute applies a process for the assessment of foren-
sics tools. This assessment includes a series of tests called Com-
puter Forensic Tool Testing (CFTT) and produces results in the
form of reports (CFTT Reports). This creates a list of NIST-approved
tools 4 for disk imaging, file carving, email parsing, etc. Approval
of tools plays a significant role in the acceptance of the tool’s re-
sults by the judicial authorities. Investigators clearly prefer the use
of tools approved by NIST. However, the search in cloud forensics
tools list illuminates the scarcity in this field. Only six tools are
related to cloud forensics: 
1. Belkasoft Evidence Center 
2. Elcomsoft Cloud Explorer 
3. Elcomsoft Phone Breaker 
4. Internet Evidence Finder 
5. Magnet AXIOM 
6. UFED Cloud Analyzer 
3. Current model 
At a structural level, CloudStack consists of a number of sub-
projects. CloudStack events are divided into three categories, 1) Ac-
tion events, 2) Usage events, 3) Alerts. They are also divided into
1) Standard events, 2) Long running job events. Finally, events are
categorized as 1) Synchronous events, 2) Asynchronous/Scheduled
events. Inside the API subproject, 352 different Action events are
defined. 
Event logging in CloudStack is performed on the cloud-server
package, which is the core of the management server. The follow-
ing operations take place (see Fig. 1 ): 
1. The API call is redirected as a web request. 
2. Checks are performed on the request. 
3. API call’s key parameters are stored. 




5. Entity executes the action and creates a response with the re-
sults. 
6. Event is logged 
The built-in class that is responsible for describing the events
n CloudStack is EventVO . Fields named type, state, description, cre-
teDate and userId provide essential information that can be used
n forensic investigation. Field “type” contains a string representing
he resource that relates to action along with the response. Field
description” is a string and information merger, different for each
vent, so it does not have a specific structure in order to be parsed
y automated tools. 
According to Table 3 , it is clear that no information is stored
n the event concerning the geographical location, e-mail address,
xact resource’s physical and logical address, platform and system
nformation that triggered the event. 
. Proposed model 
DMTF’s CADF event model [30] is a model to represent events
elated to the cloud. In a cloud infrastructure, all the resources
nteract with each other and exchange data. This exchange must
omply with specific rules and regulations. CADF explicitly defines
he term event. CADF classifies events based on the type of event,
egardless of the cloud component, cloud application or deploy-
ent model. Valid event types are 1) monitor, 2) activity, 3) con-
rol. Monitor events provide information about the status or at-
ributes of a resource. Activity events are events initiated by a re-
ource against another resource. Control events contain informa-
ion about the application of a policy. Depending on the type of
vent, some fields differ, but the core components for each event
re standard (see Table 4 ). CADF collects data (see Table 5 ) from
arious cloud layers without exposing though any information or
echnical details about the underlying infrastructure. Observer re-
ource is constantly monitoring every resource, including itself. 
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Table 4 
Required CADF components. 
Component Description 
OBSERVER The Resource that generates the event record based on its observation of the actual event 
INITIATOR The Resource that initiated the event’s Action 
ACTION The operation or activity the Initiator attempted to or performed against Target 
TARGET The Resource against which Action was performed 
OUTCOME The result of the status of the Action against Target 
Table 5 
CADF event fields. 
Field Description 
typeURI Definition of the event model’s version and name 
Id Event’s id 
eventType Type of Event 
eventTime The timestamp of the event as noted by the OBSERVER 
Action The action performed against TARGET 
Outcome The outcome of ACTION 
Initiator The resource that performed the Action 
Initiatorid INITIATOR’s id 
Target The resource against who action was performed 
Targetid TARGET ‘s id 
Observer Resource monitoring other resources and logging events 
Observerid OBSERVER’s id 
Measurements Measurements and statistics regarding the Event 
Reason More information about the OUTCOME 
Name The descriptive name for the event 
Severity The severity of the Event – used only by OBSERVER 
Duration ACTION’s duration 
Tags Tags for storing extra information 
Attachments Extra information for an event 
Reporterchain Information on the reporting chain of the event 
Table 6 
7W’s and CADF. 
W CADF component 




On What TARGET 
Where OBSERVER 





















Fig. 2. CloudStack proposed event logging model. 
Table 7 
Target and action extraction from EventVO.type. 
EventVO.type Target Resource Action 
VM.CREATE VM CREATE 






















Resource entity is classified into taxonomies [30] (Storage, Com-
ute, Network, Data, Service, System, Unknown). Top-level tax-
nomies are also divided into secondary categories. Action and
utcome entities are also classified into Taxonomies. 
CADF’s goal is to provide all the resource-related information
o investigators and system auditors in order to assist in tracking
ertain activities. It is described as the Crime Scene Investigation
CSI) for Clouds [31] . In particular, the model is designed to have
he ability to answer all the 7 W’s of forensics [15,32] (see Table 6 ).
. Implementation 
Three top-level classes were created during the implementation
f the CADF Event model, 1) Cadf, 2) Resource, 3) Taxonomy. The
ADF mechanism is implemented in the subproject cloud-server , as
art of the management server (see Fig. 2 ). 
Cadf class provides properties and methods for describing a
ADF event based on the CloudStack event(EventVO). Cadf class
elds typeURI, eventType, action, outcome, eventTime, measurement,
eason, observer, initiator and target are defined. Class structure is
imilar to CADF model (see Table 4 ) so that serialization can be
erformed on each object in JSON format and be logged in a file.ey operations are applied to match CloudStack entities to CADF
ompliant model. 
We tampered ActionEventUtils class, where generic CloudStack
vents are captured and performed the following operation in or-
er to implement our mechanism without modifying the existing
ne: 
1. When a generic CloudStack event occurs ( ActionEventUtils class),
a method is called ( createCadfRecord() ) with an EventVO object
as argument. This method creates a Cadf object and stores it to
a logger object 
2. Cadf object is created by using as an argument in its con-
structor the generic CloudStack event object in order to extract
all the information without making any changes to the actual
event source code. Every object is a single event. 
3. A check on the Cadf’s mandatory fields is performed based on
eventType field 
4. Cadf object is converted into JSON representation with Google’s
Gson library ( https://github.com/google/gson ) 
5. JSON representation of the object is logged 
Inside Cadf’s constructor, we collect all the necessary informa-
ion and match all CloudStack and CADF entities accordingly: 
1. Cadf class constructor’s parameter is the generic CloudStack
event object (EventVO). The class field typeURI is set in order
to declare this event as a event. 
2. CADF’s Action and Target are extracted from EventVO.type
property (see Table 7 ). A function ( setCADFAction()) performs
pattern matching against hashmaps to match the CloudStack





























































































6 https://github.com/apache/cloudstack-cloudmonkey . event action with a corresponding CADF Action. Cadf class field
action is set. The hashmap table is implemented in Taxonomy
class. 
3. A function ( getCADFResourceName()) matches the extracted tar-
get property against a hashmap (Taxonomy class) with CADF
standard resource names. Target Resource object is created (Re-
source class) based on this matching. 
4. Cadf class field eventType is set based on the action class field.
This is important, as for different types of events ( eventType
field) the mandatory fields of the record also differ. 
5. A function ( mapEventStateToCADFTaxonomy() ) sets the Cadf class
field’s outcome value based on a matching between generic
CloudStack’s event state property (Taxonomy class) 
6. Cadf class field eventTime is set on a UTC format 
7. Cadf class field Initiator is created (Resource class) 
8. Cadf class field Observer is created (Resource class) 
9. Additional information related to the event is collected – cur-
rently the initiator host, user agent, userid, and account name
are gathered, but these can be extended in a future work 
CADF has been created to cover any kind of event for any plat-
form. Some platforms use a specific resource for monitoring and
another for management, but CloudStack does not offer this option.
Furthermore, this implementation refers only to events that re-
sulted from a user action. For this reason, there is a manual assign-
ment to Initiator. Some additional information is being collected on
the Management Server through a list of values added to CADF as
custom fields, such as initiator_userid and initiator_csAccountName
which particularly refer to CloudStack. Other fields are the Initia-
tor’s IP address, user-agent, platform etc. 
Resource class implements properties and functionality of the
resource. A resource is used to represent entities of a CADF event.
Initiator, Observer and Target are Resource objects. In order to de-
scribe a Resource, there are mandatory properties such as typeURI,
id, name, domain, credential, addresses, host, geolocation, attach-
ments . Entities depending on the Resource, such as Host, are de-
fined as subclasses. 
Taxonomy class is auxiliary. It contains the enumerations of var-
ious fields of the CADF and Resource classes, such as e ventType,
Action and Outcome . It also contains the string constants about
the taxonomy-related Reason fields as well the string constants
for each type of resource supported by CADF. However, the most
important operation of Taxonomy class is the creation of match-
ing lists among entities of CloudStack and CADF. Matching Cloud-
Stack’s resources and actions with corresponding CADF-compliant
entities requires an understanding of each CloudStack event (352
total events). Events that could not be matched were defined as
“unknown ”. In Taxonomy class 3 hashmap structures were created
in order to match related entities 
1. CstoCadfResourceMapping for Resource matching 
2. EventActionToTypeMapping for Action matching 
3. EventResourcetoUuidMapping for unique UUID assignment 
Additionally, some property files were configured
( build/replace.properties and client/conf/log4j-cloud.xml.in ) so that
our mechanism logs event records in a separate file. 
Apache CloudStack 4.11 was forked from the original project to
a branch named “cadf_events ”. This implementation is available for
download and testing. 5 
5.1. Testing 
Testing the functionality of the CADF model was performed in
3 ways: 5 https://github.com/ndalezios/cloudstack/tree/cadf _ events . 1 CloudStack’s web interface 
2 CloudMonkey CLI 6 
3 DevCloud 4 testing environment and marvin scripts (deployDat-
aCenter.py) 
After committing this implementation, a pull request was
laced in CloudStack’s main repository with ID #3232. Pull request
tatus. 7 A tool presented in Section 8 makes use of testing’s output
le containing all the events produced during the testing phase.
he dataset is also available. 8 
.2. Validation 
All the changes made do not affect CloudStack’s functional-
ty. All the existing tests (mvn tests while constructed) were suc-
essfully passed along with the automated validation checks that
re performed after a pull request. Some Cloudstack commit-
ers reviewed our proposal and commented suggestions for mi-
or organizational issues which were addressed and fixed. Addi-
ional changes were made, and this pull request is now marked
ith GitHub labels “component:logging”, “type:enhancement” and
type:improvement”. In June 2019, a review was requested from
he rest of the committers, which is still pending. 
All the CADF event records that were logged during our tests
ere stored on a dataset following the JSON CADF format and is
vailable for download 8 along with a dataset 9 which it contains
ADF records from OpenStack’ utilization for further research. 
. Discussion 
.1. Functionality 
Upon completion of the implementation, the 7 Ws can be an-
wered by CADF as opposed to the default CloudStack model. Com-
arison of Table 3 and demonstrates the superiority of the sug-
ested model against the existing one. The functionality of the
ADF model can be divided into simple and advanced . Simple is
imited to filling only mandatory fields for each type of event,
hile advanced includes as many fields as possible. However, both
n the OpenStack project and the Apache CloudStack, CADF was not
he event mapping model for which the platform was designed.
his leads to an arbitrary decision whether changes need to be
ade within each event to provide through source code the nec-
ssary information to fill in the CADF fields, or whether matching
f fields and values should - by losing precision - be made at a
entral point. 
The most appropriate decision is to combine the above ap-
roaches and to understand and change each event separately.
owever, the process has some drawbacks. It is time-consuming
ince it concerns 352 different events. It is complicated because
ach event according to its type contains various information and
as a severe difficulty in terms of integration and merging with
he original project, as for each event a change must be made to
t least 1 CloudStack file. 
.2. Suggestions and improvements 
In order for CloudStack’s Action Events to comply with the
ADF standard, it is necessary to match each one of them with the
orresponding CADF event. CADF’s Action Taxonomy includes 26
ifferent actions. Matching is a significant problem because events7 https://github.com/apache/cloudstack/pull/3232 . 
8 https://github.com/ndalezios/clod/blob/master/cs _ events . 
9 https://github.com/ndalezios/clod/blob/master/raw _ cadf _ sample . 
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Table 8 
Cases of event naming pattern issues. 
CloudStack Event Note 
VM.DESTROY Action “DESTROY” does not exist in CADF’s Action Taxonomy 
NETWORK.CREATE Nothing to note – matches the suggested pattern 
PROXY.DIAGNOSTICS Action “DIAGNOSTICS” does not exist in CADF’s Action Taxonomy. If it existed, it should be named 
“DIAGNOSE”. The correct naming should be PROXY.DIAGNOSTICS.START 
NET.RULEADD Action RULEADD does not exist in CADF’s Action Taxonomy and should be renamed to “RULE.CREATE”. 
CREATE_ RESOURCE_DETAILS The action does not follow any naming pattern (use of “_”) and therefore cannot be ported to CADF 
CloudStack Event Note 
VM.DESTROY Action “DESTROY” does not exist in CADF’s Action Taxonomy 
























































































10 https://github.com/ndalezios/clod . n CloudStack are described verbally in the form of strings, by
erging the target resource with the action. CloudStack’s events
o not follow a specific standard. Events are characterized by the
vent_type field in terms of resource and action. In contrast, CADF
rovides an eventType field whose values determine if it is a mon-
tor, control or action event. Table 8 illustrates some indicative
ases. 
Following the aforementioned events cases, as defined in Cloud-
tack, there is a need to use a single event type format exclu-
ively for CloudStack, which could be generalized across other
latforms. The suggested format is a RESOURCE. (SUB-RESOURCE).
SUB-RESOURCE). ACTION. Where, in uppercase Latin characters, RE-
OURCE and SUB-RESOURCES (if any) are nouns, and ACTION is a
erb ( noun. (noun). (noun).verb ). By following this format, even if
here is no mapping for the Resource or Action in the CADF’s tax-
nomies, it is easy to create an events’ map. Fig. 3 illustrates the
omments inside source code with our naming suggestions 
When a CloudStack user deletes one or more events from the
atabase, apart from the deletion, no other action is taking place.
here is no information on who removed what, when, from where
tc. Events’ removal should trigger an EVENTS.DELETE event. In
act, only upon the first installation of CloudStack, event storage
hould be empty. We also implemented this functionality as an im-
rovement of the existing logging mechanism. Any action to delete
vent records must be considered as an event itself. Only in this
ay, a malicious deletion of a history of actions from CloudStack
an be identified. 
. ACPO principles and CADF 
As mentioned in [33] , four principles related to the practices
f handling and maintaining digital evidence have to be respected.
allie and Pimlott [12] studied the application of the above princi-
les to investigations in public clouds and highlighted a series of
ssues for each one of them. The CADF event model provides the
pportunity to solve some of these issues. 
Regarding the 1st principle, they detect a time gap between
he incident and the beginning of the investigation, where there
s no control over the data. However, the auditing and the pro-
osed CADF event logging solution can solve this issue by enabling
he investigator to collect log files from a time point A (before the
ncident being investigated) up to a time point B (at the time of
he beginning of the investigation). In this way, although there is
o data protection against alterations, there is a log entry of these
lterations (if any). 
Regarding the 2nd principle, since it is only about log files,
here is read-only access permitted. Besides, “Acquisition” is a for-al and defined process in common (not cloud) systems. There-
ore, the required level of competency is not increased. In fact,
he acquisition of log files can be carried out by the CSP itself
depending on the deployment model. However, if any change
ccurs in log files, this change should be considered as an event
nd should be logged. In particular, the process of deleting logged
vents does not constitute an event and is not registered in the
loudStack platform. We suggested and implemented creating an
vent record for this particular action. 
According to the 3rd principle, provisioning of an audit trail for
ach action on the digital evidence should be provided. A third in-
estigating entity should have the same results by performing the
ame actions. Due to the absence of a unified form of log files,
he investigator often resorts to custom solutions depending on the
latform investigated (OpenStack, CloudStack, AWS, MS Azure). The
rocess of repeating actions to achieve the same result involves
lso developing this custom solution. The answer to this comes
ith the introduction of a specific logging template and the cre-
tion of standardized tools - either open source (where it is easier
o check if they affect the integrity of evidence) or commercial so-
utions. A tool for all platforms can pass the necessary checks to
e certified by NIST. 
. CADF consumers 
The use of an event logging standard exempts developers from
he need to study and configure the event analysis tools according
o the platform that produced the log files. Therefore, they focus
xclusively on the standard and the interpretation of its fields. One
uch attempt is the C.Lo.D tool (CADF Log Detective), available un-
er Apache 2.0 license in a public repository at GitHub. 10 Clod’s
nput is a log file containing log records in the form of CADF as
SON. Each line in the file usually includes information about the
latform before and after the record (platform-specific information
see Fig. 4 ). 
Clod parses input file and searches each line for the CADF event
dentifier. Once it locates it, it isolates it from where it was found,
p to the point where the number of “{“ and “}” symbols are equal.
n this way, only CADF data are stored in a list. Then, CADF events
re stored in a NoSQL database (see Fig. 5 ). In particular, a “docu-
ent store” type of database manager is selected to ideally handle
SON documents. The open-source version of the MongoDB Com-
unity Server is used as the database manager. From this point
8 N. Dalezios, S. Shiaeles and N. Kolokotronis et al. / Journal of Information Security and Applications 54 (2020) 102555 
Fig. 5. Clod is processing two datasets. The file raw_cadf_sample is OpenStack’s 


















































































onwards, an investigator is able to, with a MongoDB client or by
source code, prepare and execute queries over stored CADF events.
9. Conclusions 
This paper has proposed the CADF event model implementa-
tion for the Apache CloudStack project as the main logging format.
CADF is a simple yet clear, expandable and robust model focused
on the events and not the underlying technology of the cloud in-
frastructure. OpenStack, at its current version, is using CADF –
OpenStack was CADF’s targeted platform. Even OpenStack, though,
does not fully implement CADF. This paper’s implementation for
CloudStack is not utilizing CADF’s full capabilities. The reason for
this is that in order for an event model to collect as much infor-
mation possible, it needs to touch every single event that occurs
on the platform. It has to be part of the initial design of the plat-
form. It cannot be added later on as an enhancement, because it
can cause major changes and side-effects to the entire project. Any
platform or project that can be exploited, or attacked, or used by
any manner by cybercriminals should take into consideration while
being designed, to be as much forensically friendly as possible. The
engineering team and the security team must work together and
not only test a project for vulnerabilities, but also make sure that
in case of an event, all the necessary information is collected, un-
der a standard as CADF. 
10. Future work 
In future work, a set of cyber-crime scenarios on CloudStack
should be executed and then perform forensic analysis by using
just the information stored in the CADF logs. This will bring to the
surface all the data that should be included in the event logging. 
Forensics investigators, police officers, Law Enforcement Agen-
cies and even judicial officers should examine if CADF and data
extracted from CADF, can solve a digital crime case. Are CADF data
enough to solve a case? At the same time, it should be examined
if CADF data could be accepted by the judicial authorities. 
Additionally, after having an implementation for OpenStack and
CloudStack, one should port or develop CADF to OpenNebula, the
third in ranking open source IaaS cloud platform. eclaration of Competing Interest 
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